Iran-Iraq War Essay

The Iran-Iraq state of war is meditateed as iodine of the grandest and most red-faced battles in history. This eight- form long armed contravene was actu tout ensembley the chair of some(prenominal) events. The rivalry surrounded by Iran and Iraq can be traced from the seventh light speed. It was a rivalry grounded on the antagonism amid Persians and Arabs, just as it was bring on the affair betwixt Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. These heathenish and unearthly divisions were further intensified by territorial disputes, which would continue until the 20th Century. In addition, politics played a manipulation in initiating the fight itself.The rivalry existed umpteen old age ago, grievous bodily harmly the war was exacerbate by the changes in g everywherenance in some(prenominal) countries. The Iran-Iraq contend was a violent combat amongst the aforementi peerlessd nations from phratry 1980 until dire 1988. The appointment was make outly halt with the intervention of the linked Nations. The battle proved to be a long and tedious one, as the focus betwixt the countries across-the-board for years. There were as intumesce as countless casualties as a result of the disastrous occurrence. When the war ended, neither nation could truly be say the victor. twain Iran and Iraq did non survive in gaining new territories or g all overnmental advantages. It is im portant to timber that Iraq was the nation answer suitable for starting the war. However, the aggression of ibn Talal Hussein ibn Talal Hussein was non the main motility of the wars occurrence. In fact, on that point is no iodin cause to be charge for the war. The origins of the Iran-Iraq contend be deeply root in ethnic, religious and territorial run afouls which leave back from the seventh century it was exacerbated in the modern era ascribable to ambitions of dominance.This marge paper aims to discuss the campaigns behind the Iran-Iraq warfare on devil accounts the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab river and the political tightness caused by the Islamic Revolution and the rise of Baath regime. The Iran-Iraq War occurred because of various reasons. The conflict betwixt the ii nations intricate was characterized by opposite conflicts. The latent hostility that had long persisted amidst Iran and Iraq were caused by differences in religious beliefs and political billets, as comfortably as dis systems on the borders (Iran Chamber union ICS, 2009).The problem mingled with the countries was fueled by the problems in the midst of the side by side(p) opponent starties Sunnis and Shia Muslims, Arabs and Persians, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and ibn Talal Hussein Hussein (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch, 1997). Moreover, twain Iran and Iraq relish to gain supremacy in the contri justion (Br own, 2008). The Iranian-Iraq War which started in September 1980 was a testament to the extended conflict regarding the boundaries of t heir territories and their get by in the Shatt al-Arab river (Hunseler, 1984). The war was in like manner a result of the struggle of two parties to effect the most paramount and influential in the region.However, it is important to point break by and by that there is a printificant difference surrounded by the 1980 war and the conflicts prior to it. The early conflicts between Iran and Iraq were colonized with the interference of European countries which only meddled to safeguard their respective interests. As for the 1980 war, twain sides fought to preserve their own interests. No outdoor(a) billet intervened with that war. Two main reasons why the conflict became prolonged are the vernacular disputes over territory (especially the Shatt al-Arab) and the involvement of both sides in the domestic problems of the new(prenominal) (Hunseler, 1984).The inauguration of the Persian-Arab Conflict The origins of the conflict between Iran and Iraq started to a greater ext ent centuries before both nations were settleed. It is important for one to be familiar with the history of the conflict why the 1980 war began in the branch place. According to Hunseler (1984), the Iran-Iraq tension had its roots in the seventh century with the Arab-Persian conflict. It was this centuries old time out which ignited the battle over the Shatt al-Arab. Persia stood out from the others because notwithstanding being down the stairs the pick up of the Arabs, it retained its national identity (Hunseler, 1984).In AD 636, the Sassanids of Persia lost to the armies of Arab cosmopolitan Sad bin Abi Waqqas at the Battle of Qadisiya. Mean sequence, the Persian pudding stone became dissolved in AD 642 overdue to the Battle of Nihawand. While they held on to their states culture and territorial honor, the Persian population embraced Islam in the consequence of the collapse of the Persian imperium. The Arabs and the people they conquered viewed Islam and Arabism as a un ion. However, despite being low(a) the sour of Islam, the culture of Persia cannot be keep (Hunseler, 1984).An important thing to consider in understanding the history of Persia and its political and companionable existence is what Hunseler (1984) called the juxtaposition of Persia and Islam (p. 8). The principle was state to have been derived from the notion of the state ground on Zoroastrianism. According to the Zoroastrian notion of a state, it moldiness have the following a secularly-legitimized kingship, the survival of the Persian words and the proud awareness of a intelligible Persian history (Hunseler, 1984, p. 8). aft(prenominal) two centuries, the Sunni-Arab Abbasid caliphate had sprain interest in the Persian literature (Hunseler, 1984).In time, the Persian families which belonged to the caliphate of the Abbasids began to apply hold by grabbing power repeatedly. From AD 954 until 1055, the Buyid dynasty possessed enough authority to wangle politics in the we stern peck of Persia and Iraq. In addition, they likewise had the power to purely limit the function of the caliphs of Abbasid to godliness only. This was the reason why the legacy left by the Buyids in Iraq was considered as the conflict between Persianism and Arabism (Hunseler, 1984). In the 17th century, the Safavids in Persia say Shiism as the state regenerateeousness (Hunseler, 1984).The Safavids exerted influence on Persia for 15 long years they stayed in the state from 1623 to 1638 (Hiro, 1991). The resolving was seen as Persias attempt to establish its boundaries and separate itself from Arab nations while keeping the matters under the influence of Islam. Shiism became a pivotal part of Islamic history, as it was the prototypal to lay a rift in the unified world of Islam. This was because Shiism founded itself in a separate state. The kings of the Safavids considered themselves as principally secular leaders they assigned the religious functions to the theologia ns.In flake, the Shia ministers did not desire to give up their posts which were assigned to them under the Safavid rule. Most especially during the time of the Qajar leaders, the clergy were habituated money and land. The awarding of such gifts allowed them to be financially independent from the king it likewise gave them the luck to exert political influence. Meanwhile, no such equivalent progress had occurred in the Sunni Arab states (Hunseler, 1984). The Sunni-Shia Problem The existing Persian-Arab conflict had taken a complicated turn with the addition of withal another conflict the Sunni-Shia problem (Hunseler, 1984).The problem was not exactly about tension between the differing branches of Islam. Instead, there was antagonism due to the tally of influence that a particular religion has on the cultivation of political power in the state. The conflict continues at present day, as there are legato realms wherein the Arab communities consist of both Sunni and Shia fact ions (Hunseler, 1984). Those who ear the Shia clergy in Arab countries such as Iraq and Bahrain found difficulty in assumptive certain social positions (Hunseler, 1984).In Persia, the Shia clergy had no problems exerting influence in order of magnitude because Shiism was revered with national significance. In addition, Shia leaders faced with two appears regarding loyalty. First, they encouraged the spread of Shiism in states whose population were not exclusively Shia. Therefore, they became problematical in the centuries-old conflict between the Shia and Sunni. Second, they were victims of the suspicions of Arab rulers who thought they were submitting to the influence of non-Arabs (Persians).They were often seen by their Arab counterparts as promoting non-Arab causes. This situation caused the Arab Shias to be constantly detached from their political leaders. The time interval was alike caused by doubt on secular lead, as well as Shia millennialism (Hunseler, 1984). The P ersian-Arab conflict and the attempts of both sides to be amount more dominant and influential than the other in the Middle East became unequivocal in areas where the Sunni and Shia groups, and the Arabs and Persians, fought once once morest each other (Hunseler, 1984).Even though the Persians and Arabs in the Arabian peninsula had the Persian-Arab disjuncture to set them apart in terms of geography, the conflict eventually do itself apparent on the boundaries on land. This was the first-string reason why the conflict persisted for m either another(prenominal) years both sides incessantly tested to acquire the territories of the other and the quest for a mutual border dragged on (Hunseler, 1984). The logical argument of the Conflict over the Shatt al-Arab The conflict between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab river originated in the 17th century and began as the rift between the footstool Empire and Persia (Hunseler, 1984).The sultan of bomb calorimeter, Murad IV, captur ed capital of Iraq in 1638 and the initial colonisation regarding the boundaries with Persia was drafted a year later. The Kurds and the Armenians occupied the north while the Arabs reign the south. The confines fell on areas wherein the tribes did not consider either the Persians or Turks as their masters. As a result, the border colonization was drafted with consideration to the tribes and the names of the places. The intellect also took in consideration the tendency of both parties to unite the tribes of Istanbul or Esfahan.The Kurdish-Armenian terminus ad quem caused m any conflicts subsequently it was established, but order was forever and a day restored in reference to the 1639 village. Unfortunately, the 1639 agreement proved lacking in setting the boundaries in the Shatt al-Arab region. On one hand, Persians believed the river itself was a innate(p) border. On the other hand, the Turks upheld the claim that the river belonged to the pouffe Empire. According to th e Turkish point of view, the Arab tribes which guide both sides of the river are considered a single entity from Arabistan. Arabistan is part of the Ottoman Empire.Hence, the Shatt al-Arab was to be considered as under the possession of the Ottoman Empire (Hunseler, 1984). In the 19th Century, limitation problems keep. In 1823, a enclosure problem skirt the Muhammarah surfaced and Persians settled in the city (Hunseler, 1984). Both Russia and Great Britain extended their tending on the matter. On whitethorn 15, 1843, a bourne war machine missionary train was formed and gathered in Erzerum, a city in misfire. The direction consisted of representatives from Turkey, Persia, Russia and Britain. A agreement was stimulated on May 31, 1847, and contained three major guidelines.First, Muhammarah and its harbor, as well as Khidhr Island, were awarded to Persia. Meanwhile, Turkey was granted ingress to Zuhab and Sulaymaniyah. Second, the deputation was designated in situ to d elineate the specialized course of the boundary (Hunseler, 1984, p. 11). Lastly, the Ottoman Empire was given over the entire Shatt al-Arab extending to the marker on the eastmost, except for the territories mentioned above (Hunseler, 1984). The agreement of 1847 was earlier ambiguous, and its inherent vagueness proved to be its biggest daub (Hunseler, 1984).The agreement did not target the examination of which nation had the responsibility over the easterly shore. While the Shatt al-Arab was placed under Turkish legal power, the specialisedations of the border were not indicated. Turkey valued to fade out the break over the agreements vague statements regarding Arabistan/ Khuzistan. As a result, Russia and Great Britain include an explanatory eminence to assert that the problem raised by Turkey was not compromised by the treatys lack of clarity (Hunseler, 1984, p. 11). Turkey declined to approve the treaty until Persia acknowledged the note as part of the treaty (Hun seler, 1984).Mirza Muhammad Ali caravansary acknowledged the note and signed the treaty as a delegate of the Persia. by and by the Persian administration discovered the cellular inclusion of the added note, it nullified the treaty and failed to approve it. They argued that the Persian representative had no power to sign the document (Hunseler, 1984). To address the pop, the boundary committal inspected the Turkish-Persian border from 1850 until 1852 (Hunseler, 1984). Unfortunately, the consignment was not able to do its job properly because of the opposing claims of Turkish and Persian military missioners.Persia maintained that they were given the entire expanse found east of the Shatt al-Arab, while Turkey opposed the claim. The committee was unable to provide a certain(prenominal) proposition to solve the problem. While the committee continued its efforts in the blue area of the Shatt al-Arab, the determination of the boundaries of the rivers region was postponed in defined ly (Hunseler, 1984). Persia was relentless in its efforts to claim territories and continued to bring up its border issues in the succeeding years. Persia sought Russia and Britain to mediate on the border problem (Hunseler, 1984).Persia wanted to partake control of the Shatt al-Arab with Turkey the state also wanted to discuss the rights with regards to the harbor. Unfortunately, Britain and Russia were not in agreeable terms since the mid-19th Century. Hence, both nations were not prepared to mediate in behalf of the Shatt al-Arab tension. On August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Russian convention had an agreement. This agreement carve up Persia into three separate districts. In the northern part of Persia, Russia maintained a landing field of influence. In the southern area, Britain had its own sphere.Meanwhile, the nerve area was considered as neutral ground. It was not until by and by this division was established that the Anglo-Russian stir for the Turkish-Persian border was revi ved (Hunseler, 1984). Russia became once again involved with Persian-Turkish affairs because it was specifically evoke with the duty of Azerbaijan in Persia (Hunseler, 1984). The interest was the result of strategic and economic factors in intercourse to Turkey. On the contrary, Britain was different from Russia because its interests were not express to Persia alone.Britain was also focused on the Turkish territory of the Shatt al-Arab because it played a pivotal part in British interests in the Gulf area. In July 1911, an Anglo-Turkish mediation in attempt to come up with a resolution that would define the territorial claims and rights in the Arab-Persian Gulf region began. On July 29, 1913, the resolution was signed by Turkey and Britain. The agreement included the decisions regarding the status of Arab sheikdoms. The resolution also included the agreements about the Shatt al-Arab and its significance to the change magnitude British authority in Arabistan and Iraq.The resol ution proved to be beneficial for Turkey, but only because Britain acted on it for its own advantage. Meanwhile, Russia was offend by the Anglo-Turkish agreement and initially renounced it. Britain caught Russia by surprise by awarding the Shatt al-Arab in its entirety to Turkey. Russia had its own interests to protect in Shatt al-Arab and the Gulf area, and the agreement served as a hindrance to the Russian cause. However, Britain gave Russia the guarantee that it would fracture assistance in the last mentioneds interest in the northern department of the Turkish-Persian border.After Britain gave its guarantee, Russia acknowledged the Anglo-Turkish agreement (Hunseler, 1984). On declination 21, 1911, Persian Foreign minister of religion and Turkish representatives from capital of Iran gathered in Istanbul to create a boundary representation to resolve the Turkish-Persian border problem (Hunseler, 1984). The bearing began to meet in March 1912 by August, the commission had c onvened a total of 18 times. In the beginning, the efforts of the commission seemed futile due to Persias disapproval of a specific note explicative of April 26, 1847 (Hunseler, 1984, p. 13).However, Russia exerted influence and Tehran was abilityd to agree on the note on August 15, 1912. The early progress of the Turkish-Persian commission was accompanied by statements already found in the Four-Power Protocol of Constantinople dated on November 17, 1913. With regards to the area of the Shatt al-Arab, the definition of the border was rigid in conformity with the Second treaty of Erzerum of 1847. According to the treaty, the Shatt al-Arab is considered as a Turkish territory excluding the limitations concerning Abadan and Muhammarah. By November 1913, two-thirds of the border concession was completed.The t involve of settling the complete boundary was given to a Four-Power Delimitation Commission. This commission had to define the border base on what was 1869s carte identique ( Hunseler, 1984, p. 13). The commission started working(a) in 1914. Unfortunately, the First World War broke out. The emergence of the war hindered Persia and Turkey from acknowledging the border (Hunseler, 1984). The Aftermath of World War I The Iranian-Iraq Disagreement on the Shatt al-Arab The conflict and rivalry between Iran and Iraq officially started after the First World War (Hunseler, 1984).The outgrowth of the war significantly altered the issue over the borders concerning the Shatt al-Arab. Hunseler (1984) explained The British mandate of Iraq, which had come about in Mesopotamia, entered into the Turkish boundary claims against Iran, although it also impinged upon British navigational privileges on the Shatt al-Arab (p. 14). The aftermath of the Great War also allowed Iran to experience a dramatic political transformation. In 1921, Muhammad Reza Khan came into power. Under his reign, Iran became skanky to the established agreements regarding the Shatt al-Arab (Hunsele r, 1984).It was also in 1921 when Khazal, the fop of Muhammarah, lost. Khazal was a known title-holder of the British cause. With his defeat, Iran was granted the opportunity to fervently defend its own interests on the Shatt al-Arab conflict. payable to the new found empowerment of Iran, Britain was on the spur of the moment placed in a position wherein it should implement its rules without putting its Iranian interests in jeopardy (Hunseler, 1984). Meanwhile, Iraq asserted its control over the Shatt al-Arab (Hunseler, 1984). Due to the claim, Iran declined to recognize the state of Iraq.In 1929, Iran did give diplomatic fruition to Iraq, but only because it sought to gain the caution of Britain. Iran hoped that by acknowledging Iraq as a state, Britain would be sympathetic towards the Iranian cause. Britain was all the same interested in Iran because of economic reasons the former is involved with the latter by means of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Moreover, Britain was s till interested with the Shatt al-Arab issue. This was because it could provide the British complete gateway to the refineries located in Abadan. On August 11, 1929, the Iranian and Iraqi governments had interchanged several(prenominal)(prenominal) notes.This exchange gave way to the establishment of a temporary arrangement to manage the transaction between the two states involved. The arrangement included resolutions on trade and navigation. However, the negotiations failed because Iraq and Britain refused to recognize the jurisdiction of Iran on the half of the river (Hunseler, 1984). When Britain decided to stumble its authority on Iraq and break past from their alliance in 1930, it imposed the right of the British navy to pass through the Shatt al-Arab anytime, regardless if it was wartime or peacetime (Hunseler, 1984).However, Iran had no intention in being involved in a peaceful settlement. The Iranian government also declined to presume the legitimacy of the border. On March 25, 1924, Iran announced its non-acceptance of determination of the boundary as stated in the Constantinople Protocol. The Iranian government also refused to recognize similar settlements created on September 20 and declination 2 in 1931. The situation worse when Iran sent four gunboats to pass through Shatt al-Arab and proceed until Muhammarah.Due to this incident, problems regarding the pilot and the gladioluss of the ships were added to the already intense conflict (Hunseler, 1984). The boundary issue as well as the flag and pilot inquiries which remained unanswered increased the tension surrounding the conflict (Hunseler, 1984). On November 29, 1934, the Iranian government was forced to seek assistance from the League of Nations in an effort to address the problem. Unfortunately, the League of Nations and the representatives it sent failed to bring any positive change in the live situation.The only thing which provided temporary resolution to the problem was the Middl e East agreement of 1935, which Iran had introduced with the help of Turkey. The pact presented an opportunity wherein all points of disagreement could be settled. On July 4, 1937, a treaty on the Iranian-Iraqi border was hold upon in Tehran. The treaty upheld the conditions indicated in the 1913/14 Protocols of Constantinople. According to the treaty, the Iran-Iraq border would remain on the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab. There were specific considerations made for Abadan and Muhammarah. Iran was also awarded an anchorage ground district in Abadan which was four miles long.In addition, the treaty rendered the river as open territory, as it allowed access to naval ships of Iran and Iraq and traders of all countries. A deportation fee was imposed, but this would be utilise for purposes of maintenance as well as the development of the conveyance lanes in the river. In another decision, both sides agreed to accept the protocol within two years after the agreement had been reac hed (Hunseler, 1984). The adoption of the covenant was not implemented (Hunseler, 1984). On December 8, 1938, the commission in charge of the Iranian-Iraqi boundary started working on the confluence of the Shatt al-Arab and the Khayeen.The efforts of the commission were stalled by opposing translations of the treaty and the definite determination of the border. The Iranian government submitted suggestions regarding the eternal rest of power between Iran and Iraq with regards to supervising and safeguarding the Shatt al-Arab transport lanes. Meanwhile, the Iraqi administration saw this survive as a threat to the sovereignty of the Iraqis on the river (Hunseler, 1984). In the 1950s, Iran and Iraq had another opportunity to resolve their issues regarding the Shatt al-Arab border (Hunseler, 1984).In 1955, both countries, along with Britain, Pakistan and Turkey agreed upon the capital of Iraq Pact (Karsh, 2002). This pact was initiated by the western and was established to strengthe n defense and bail in the region. In October 1957, King Faisal of Iraq paying(a) a state visit to Iran (Hunseler, 1984). In this encounter, both nations reached an agreement regarding the Shatt al-Arab problem. Iran and Iraq agreed on two points. First, there bequeath be a commission to be based in capital of Iraq which is assigned to work out the details of the joint management of the Shatt al-Arab.Second, a Swedish adjudicator will be in charge of delineating the border this justice is to be find out in Tehran and must work with the joint commission. erstwhile again, an agreement between Iran and Iraq was hindered by in so far another occurrence. On July 14, 1958, a variation broke out in Baghdad (Hunseler, 1984). The change in Iraqi government activity eventually disrupted the recently resumed development of Iranian-Iraqi ties (Hunseler, 1984). Also, the political change once again awakened the border conflict on the Shatt al-Arab and the land borders.Four short months after normal Abd al-Karim took control, the revolutionary administration of Iraq declared that they would extend their claim on the river to 12 miles. On November 28, 1959, Iranian Shah Reza Pahlevi revived their involve to have the border line of the river bony along the middle. He justified his train on grounds of Iraqs sort violation of the 1937 treaty. He also argued that because they were already in the 20th Century, a river which served as a boundary such as Shatt alArab cannot be attached to the unconditional sovereignty of either nation.General Qasim communicate the demand of the shah with another demand. Iraq sought to determine the anchorage zone awarded to Iran in the 1937 treaty. patronage their counter demand, Qasim still wanted to resolve the dispute through peaceful means. Iraq was spontaneous to withdraw their claim of the anchorage zone if Iran would acknowledge the Iraqs demands on the river and the treaty of 1937. The peaceful settlement was not reached. On December 10, 1959, Abbas Iranian Foreign minister of religion Abbas Aram declined Iraqs offer.Nine days later, General Qasim reasserted Iraqs legal right to the anchorage zone without insisting on its return. He also appealed for Iran to value the early treaties. General Qasim suggested that they could address the problem with the help of the united Nations. However, Iran provoked Iraq again when the local publisher Ettelaat stated that the existence of Iraq was in any event a historical fault and the whole of Iraq a Persian province (as cited in Hunseler, 1984, p. 17). An armed struggle between Iran and Iraq was quelled before the further tension could develop.On March 5, 1959, Iran became involved with the united States in a defense settlement (Hunseler, 1984). Soon after, Iran felt coerced by Russia. Iran had reasons to be concerned. It was threatened by Soviet influence and the possible circulation of further revolutionary ideals. Meanwhile, Iraq was also concerned with the threat of the United Arab Republic, a state established in 1958 as a result of the merger between Syria and Egypt. Abd al-Karim Qasim was frightened that Syria might provide assistance to Iraqi Nasserites if and when a war with Iran occurs.Hence, there was no real war between both parties at that time. The tension manifested itself through a media war between Iran and Iraq (Hunseler, 1984). In 1967, Britain declared its wishes to pull out from the Gulf area. Prime Minister Harold Wilson expressed the desire of the British administration to remove its military troops located east of Suez (as cited in Hunseler, 1984, p. 17). With this announcement, Iran wanted to replace British forces with their own troops on the moment of the latters departure (Hunseler, 1984).The 1967 blockage of the Suez furnish was a welcome development, as it prevented Soviet activity in the Gulf region. In terms of security concerns, Iran wanted to mingle and lead the Arab countries in the region. The sup posed compact had the goal of preventing the spread of Soviet control and power of revolutionary nations and factions, such as South Yemen and Iraq. The Arab countries in the Gulf were circumspect in dealing with Iran. While they were hesitating to collaborate with Iran which was associated with Israel, they did not want to create a rift among the states (Hunseler, 1984).Iran continued to potently pursue its ambition of becoming an unshakeable force in the Gulf region (Hunseler, 1984). In 1969, it condemned the 1937 treaty. The shah knew that if Iran wanted to govern and manipulate the shipping lanes in the Gulf, it must have exclusive control of the river. This move would also acquit the Iranian ports on Abadan and Khorramshahr from Iraqi jurisdiction. On one instance, an Iranian vessel sailed despite the absence of an Iraqi pilot. It departed from the Khorramshahr port with the assistance of Iranian patrol vessels and successfully arrived at the Persian-Arab Gulf.Iraq was awa re of the violation, but it did not wage a war against Iran due to the weakness of the military (Hunseler, 1984). After 1972, the shah became more determined to cripple Iraq. After the fulfilment of the Iraqi-Soviet association treaty, the Shah approached American President Richard Nixon to ask for assistance in the Kurdish cause in Iraq (Hunseler, 1984). This action was done with the fair game of weakening the Iraqi army through an attack on its internal disputes. In August 1972, another uprising emerged in Kurdistan.The Iraqi administration and Kurdish captain Mullah Mustafa Barzani met in March 1970 and agreed on the autonomy of Kurdistan beginning in 1974. However, the agreement was threatened by the support of Iran and the United States for Barzani. Because of this, the Kurdish insurgents continued to hold on to their weapons and proceed with the civil war. Meanwhile, the Iraqi forces benefited from the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty, for it allowed for a steady supply of ammo from Russia. The weapons were instrumental in guaranteeing the military success of Iraq.Nevertheless, the malfunctioning of the armys weapons and the calamity of the Soviet Union to provide more ammunition endangered the progress Iraq had in its fight against the Kurds. In the early part of March 1975, the Iraqi government was prompted to consider Irans proposition that it would refrain from reinforcement the Kurds if the former would approve the latters suggestion to resolve the border issue by placing the border line along the thalweg (Hunseler, 1984). On June 13, 1975, Iran and Iraq agreed on yet another treaty in Baghdad (Hunseler, 1984).The treaty consisted of four crucial agreements. First, the boundaries will be definitely marked based on the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the 1914 proposal created by the committee regarding the establishment of the boundary. Second, the river boundaries would be situated in the middle, or the thalweg. According to willet (2004), the thalweg was the central deepest part of the river (p. 7). Third, there are two things to be rebuilt the mutual cartel between both nations as well as the security of the land boundaries they shared.Also, the trespass on both sides will be stopped. Lastly, the problem will be settled upon with the acknowledgement of the aforementioned points. When Iraq signed the treaty, the country accepted the thalweg agreement for the first time. After five years, it became evident that the said recognition was merely the result of coercion from Irans side. The acceptance of Iraq was also caused by the chastisement of the Soviet Union to provide weapons. Nonetheless, the compromise made regarding the Shatt al-Arab paved the way for the Kurdish civil war to stop.Meanwhile, the relevance of the river in terms of Iranian strategy was relatively reduced. This was because Iran transferred its navy from Khorramshahr to the Bandar Abbas port in August 1978 (Hunseler, 1984). The Iran-Iraq War from a Political persuasion The dispute over the borders and boundaries of the river of Shatt al-Arab was instrumental in the emergence of the war between Iran and Iraq in 1980. While the territorial conflicts played a crucial role in causing the war, the political conditions in both countries must also be considered as initiators.The variation in the governments helped influence the leaders on how to deal with the Shatt al-Arab issue. In Iran, there was a dramatic shift in leaders as the Shah was removed from power through a revolution led by a radical Muslim. In Iraq, several takeovers have altered governance while the rise of the Baath Socialist political party to power resulted in the domination of Saddam Hussein. Both countries longed to dominate the other and emerge as the most powerful in the region (Jacoby, 2008). The Iranian-Iraqi situation under the feel of the ShahIn the 1970s, the tension between Iran and Iraq was heightened (Karsh, 2002). This was because of the Shah o f Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, became hostile and tried to present Iran as the dominant force in the Persian Gulf. The Shah had been governance the Iran for decades. However, he was temporarily overthrown from power. In 1953, the passing of the Iranian Parliament started a coup to remove the Shah (Willett, 2004). The coup succeeded and Pahlavi vacated the Iranian leadership for a brief time. However, the United States